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TVA and the Trump Administration are rushing new nuclear power plant technologies that are unproven and not cost effective while weakening the regulatory framework designed to review cost and safety

Stephen Smith | May 27, 2025

| Nuclear, Southeast, Tennessee, Utilities

Forgetting History While Ignoring Cost and Safety

This past week we saw a flurry of rushed decisions around nuclear power, first with TVA submitting a construction permit for their GE-Hitachi BWRX-300 Small Modular Reactor design near Oak Ridge, Tennessee followed late Friday afternoon, May 23, 2025 with four Trump Executive Orders apparently attempting to restructure the regulatory framework of nuclear power oversight and accelerating deployment of more unproven nuclear power designs. We have known that TVA was exploring the SMR technology, but had understood it was not cost-effective and that a decision to move forward had not been made; this action would indicate otherwise.

The Executive Orders raise more questions than they answer, but appear to push the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to short-circuit their safety and review process and even allow the Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) to rush forward with nuclear power plants outside of the regulatory process. Congress separated the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1974 with the Energy Reorganization Act, signed into law by President Ford, which created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to handle nuclear safety regulation. The Department of Energy (DOE) was created later in 1977 through the Department of Energy Organization Act, which took over the AEC’s nuclear weapons and energy development functions along with energy programs from other agencies.

The separation was designed to address conflicts of interest that had developed within the AEC, which had been both promoting nuclear technology and regulating its safety since 1946. The 1974 reorganization split these functions, giving the NRC independent regulatory authority over civilian nuclear power while transferring the promotional and weapons-related activities to what would become the DOE.

Executive Order Concerns

According to Peter Behr’s Politico Energy Wire story, former nuclear regulators and industry experts are raising serious alarms about Trump’s executive orders potentially undermining decades of independent nuclear safety oversight. Former NRC chairs Allison Macfarlane and Stephen Burns warn that political interference in the historically independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission will “crater” essential public confidence in nuclear power and damage public trust. The orders mandate staff reductions at the NRC while simultaneously requiring the agency to complete a “wholesale revision” of safety regulations within months, leading Senator Ed Markey to warn that “it will be impossible for NRC to maintain a commitment to safety and oversight with staffing levels slashed and expertise gone.”

Technical Challenges Remain Complex

The advanced reactor technologies that Trump is counting on for his nuclear “renaissance” present unprecedented safety review challenges that cannot be rushed without significant risk. According to a 2023 National Academies study, most advanced reactors use unfamiliar cooling systems like liquid sodium, helium gas, or molten salt instead of traditional water cooling, requiring extensive testing and safety analysis. Former NRC Chair Richard Meserve emphasized that “there is no way to cut corners on ensuring that these new features are carefully analyzed,” while industry veteran Amir Afzali noted that sodium-cooled reactors face “significant fire risk, as sodium ignites explosively on contact with air,” requiring rigorous testing and monitoring that increases costs.

Will We Ever Learn

Critics point to recent nuclear project failures as evidence that regulatory shortcuts won’t solve the industry’s fundamental cost problems. The Georgia Power Vogtle expansion, which used NRC-approved reactor designs, still ended up costing $35 billion and running seven years late — problems that stemmed from construction and financing issues rather than regulatory delays. As Afzali observed, “the NRC can’t be blamed for the issues Vogtle faced,” and history across industries shows that “weakening oversight and blurring the lines between promotion and regulation” leads to “serious consequences.” The orders risk repeating past mistakes by prioritizing speed over safety in an industry where public trust and technical precision are paramount. Proponents of nuclear power have concerns that the Executive Orders may be illegal and increase uncertainty and delays.

Small Modular Reactors: Big Promises, Bigger Price Tags

TVA Dreaming

TVA has been dreaming about having an SMR for years. Submitting a request for an Early Site Permit at the Clinch River Nuclear Site in 2016 and receiving the permit in 2019. Recruiting partners and submitting an application for $800 million in taxpayer funds to be a “first mover” in SMR technology.

This dream has been hyped by many Tennessee politicians and the Oak Ridge community who have never met a nuclear project they did not like. As with many dreams they can take a turn for the worse when not grounded in reality. The missing reality in this dream, as with so many nuclear proponents’ dreams, is price and schedule. TVA’s C-suite executives dreams can easily become Tennessee Valley ratepayers’ worst nightmare when fuzzy math and hype prevail over facts and prudence. Below are the facts that beg for more prudence. 

BWRX-300 and other SMRs pose significant financial risks to ratepayers

In the race to decarbonize our electricity system, small modular reactors (SMRs) have been touted as the nuclear industry’s silver bullet – smaller, faster to build, and more affordable than their larger predecessors. Among the leading designs is GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300, which has attracted interest from utilities across North America. But recent expert testimony before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission by energy analyst David Schlissel raises serious questions about whether these reactors can deliver on their promises or will instead burden ratepayers with massive costs.

The rising price tag of the BWRX-300

While GE Hitachi has kept many of the BWRX-300’s financial details under wraps, what we do know is concerning. According to Schlissel’s testimony, TVA’s recent filings reveal an estimated overnight cost for the BWRX-300 of $17,949 per kilowatt in 2024 dollars. This figure only covers the base construction costs – it doesn’t include financing costs or inflation during the years of construction.

When all costs are factored in, the final price per kilowatt will be substantially higher. For comparison, that base cost is already nearly twice as high as what GE Hitachi initially suggested the reactor might cost.

“The estimated all-in cost of the project must be much higher than shown,” Schlissel testified, noting that overnight costs exclude escalation and financing costs that typically add substantial amounts to nuclear projects.

The pattern of ballooning costs

The BWRX-300 isn’t unique in facing cost increases. Every SMR design on the market has seen dramatic cost escalation before a single reactor has been built in the United States:

• NuScale’s SMR project saw costs nearly triple from $6,833/kW in 2015 to $20,130/kW by 2023 before being canceled
• X-Energy’s reactor cost estimates jumped 72% in just three years (2021-2024)
• TerraPower’s Natrium reactor, initially touted as potentially costing $11,594/kW, is now estimated at $28,986/kW according to recent admissions by Bill Gates, the company’s founder

“It is extremely likely that any future SMRs or large reactors will cost far more and take far longer to build than the nuclear industry and its supporters now claim,” Schlissel concluded. “That has been the long history of nuclear power in the United States, and I see no evidence that leads me to believe it will change anytime in the foreseeable future.”

The international experience is no better

Supporters of the BWRX-300 and other SMR designs often suggest we should ignore the U.S. nuclear industry’s troubled history of cost overruns. But the international experience with SMRs tells the same story:

• China’s Shidao Bay SMR cost tripled from its original estimate
• Russia’s floating SMRs saw costs quadruple
• Argentina’s CAREM 25 SMR has had cost increases of over 600% and is still under construction

Just as troubling, these projects all faced years-long schedule delays. China’s SMR took 11 years instead of 4 to complete, while Russia’s took 13 years instead of 3. Argentina’s is still under construction after 10 years, with at least 3 more years to go.

For the BWRX-300, which has yet to begin construction anywhere, these patterns suggest ratepayers should be extremely skeptical of current cost and schedule projections.

Factory fabrication: An empty promise?

A central claim made about the BWRX-300 and other SMRs is that they will be less expensive because modules will be manufactured in factories and assembled on site. However, as Schlissel points out, none of the SMR vendors marketing designs in the U.S. currently have factories where their reactor modules are being built.

“One of the key claims by supporters of SMRs is that the reactors will be less expensive to build because key reactor modules will be manufactured in factories and assembled on site. Yet, to my knowledge, no SMR vendor has yet opened a single factory,” Schlissel testified.

This same promise was made for the AP1000 reactors built at Georgia’s Plant Vogtle, which were supposed to utilize modular construction techniques to reduce costs and construction time. Instead, the project experienced a 157% cost overrun and a 6 to 7 year schedule delay – hardly a promising precedent for the BWRX-300.

No evidence of a learning curve

GE Hitachi and other SMR vendors claim that building multiple copies of the same design will lead to cost declines over time. But Schlissel’s analysis found no evidence of such a “positive learning curve” in nuclear construction:

“Even the French nuclear program, which relied on a high degree of standardization in the design of its 58 reactors built between 1974 and 1990, failed to achieve a positive learning curve. Instead, costs continued to increase over time despite the program’s design standardization.”

His analysis of construction schedules for recent reactor designs shows no meaningful reduction in construction time for subsequent builds of the same design.

Still too expensive, even with subsidies

Even with the Inflation Reduction Act’s generous 50% Investment Tax Credit for new nuclear plants built in communities that have had now-retired fossil plants, Schlissel’s analysis found that the cost of electricity from SMRs like the BWRX-300 would still be far higher than renewable alternatives.

Using NREL’s Annual Technical Baseline data, Schlissel demonstrated that SMR power would cost $115-251/MWh in 2035, compared to much lower costs for wind, solar PV, and storage. It’s worth noting that while tax credits reduce costs to ratepayers, they simply shift the burden to taxpayers – who are the very same people.

Too slow to address climate change

The climate crisis demands rapid action. Yet even by optimistic projections, the first BWRX-300 won’t be operational until the 2030s. Given the patterns of delay seen in every nuclear project to date, the timeline could easily stretch into the 2040s.

Meanwhile, renewable energy and storage systems can be deployed in months or a few years, making them far more effective tools for near-term carbon reduction.

The flexibility factor

Perhaps most concerning for ratepayers is that investing in expensive nuclear projects like the BWRX-300 locks utilities into very long-term financial commitments when future electricity demand is uncertain. If the dramatic increases in demand currently forecast don’t materialize, or if they materialize differently than expected, ratepayers could be stuck paying for expensive overcapacity.

As Schlissel notes: “A renewable energy park would give the Company valuable flexibility in its resource planning… New resources could be added in a relatively shorter number of years if demand grows at a higher rate than now expected. This flexibility is vital in today’s dynamic energy transition.”

Conclusion: A risky bet for ratepayers

The BWRX-300 and other SMRs represent a massive financial gamble for utilities and their ratepayers. While the technology sounds promising, the evidence suggests these reactors will follow the same pattern of massive cost overruns and delays that have plagued nuclear projects for decades.

Before committing billions of ratepayer dollars to these unproven technologies, utilities and regulators should carefully consider the overwhelming evidence that SMRs like the BWRX-300 are unlikely to deliver on their promises of affordable, timely carbon-free power.

As expert David Schlissel recommends, a more prudent approach would be to invest in proven renewable energy and battery storage technologies that can be deployed quickly, scaled flexibly, and have consistently demonstrated falling costs over time.

This blog post is based on expert testimony by David A. Schlissel before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission in April 2025, as part of Proceeding No. 24A-0442E concerning Public Service Company of Colorado’s application for approval of its 2024 Just Transition Solicitation.